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Abstract: 
This paper examines China’s LCC market and assesses the network development patterns from a 
geographical perspective. Overall, a nationwide LCC network has been formed with each individual 
LCC focusing on their own markets with limited overlap to avoid cut-throat competition. Spring 
Airlines has developed an advanced network supported by its core bases including Shanghai in East 
China, Shijiazhuang in North China, Shenyang in Northeast China and Shenzhen in South China. 
China United has developed a network radiating from Beijing. West Air and Lucky Air seem to be 
developing a hub-and-spoke network that contributes to the tourism industry in West China. The 
LCC network is affected by seasonal variations, especially for the routes to tourism destinations such 
as Haikou, Sanya and Xiamen. Hub cities, however, experience less seasonal impact. This research 
also finds that routes between 600-1800 km account for a large proportion of the LCC markets. 
Aviation policy, local government’s subsidization and the expansion of the high-speed rail network 
have helped shape the landscape of China’s LCC sector. 
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1. Introduction  
China’s private airlines emerged in 2005 after the government opened the air transport sector to 
private investors in 2004. Three private carriers (Okay Airways based in Tianjin, United Eagle 
Airlines in Chengdu, and Spring Airlines in Shanghai) launched their maiden flights in 2005. In 2006 
two more private carriers (Junyao in Shanghai, and East Star Airlines in Wuhan) commenced their 
services. By the end of 2007 the number of private airlines in China reached 20. One of these private 
carriers, Spring Airlines, adopted the low-cost carrier (LCC) business model, and is now the largest 
LCC in China. The quick increase in the number of new private airlines put huge competitive 
pressure on the state-owned carriers, which was deemed as undesirable by the Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC), the nation’s civil aviation regulator (Zhang and Zhang, 2016). As 
a result, the CAAC stopped granting new licenses for establishing new carriers during the period 
2007-2013. This policy was not repealed until 2013, and a revised version of the Provisions on the 
Business Licensing for Public Air Transportation Enterprises was issued in 2014. The revised 
Provisions emphasized the safety requirements, but acknowledged the role of market mechanism in 
the air transport sector and thus simplified the operating permit approval procedure, aiming to 
promote the development of the low cost aviation sector. As a result, from 2013 to 2015, there was 
another wave of the entry of private airlines and LCCs.  
By the end of 2017, there were five airlines in China adopting the low-cost business model, which 
were Spring Airlines, West Airlines, China United Airlines, Jiuyuan Airlines and Lucky Air. Spring 
and Jiuyuan are private airlines. West Airlines and Lucky Air are owned by Hainan Airlines (HNA) 
Group and used to be full service airlines (FSAs). Believing that West China has great potential for 
LCC operation, HNA transformed West Airlines and Lucky Air into LCCs in 2013 and in 2016, 
respectively. China United belonged to Air Force before 2004 and was taken over by Shanghai 
Airlines. Both Shanghai Airlines and China United are now subsidiaries of the China Eastern Group. 
China United adopted the LCC business model in 2014. Table 1 shows the general information of the 
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LCCs including their fleet size, home airport and ownership. As the earliest Chinese LCC, Spring 
owns the largest number of aircraft. It accounts for about 40% of the LCC market measured by the 
fleet size. By the end of 2017, the market share of LCCs in China’s domestic market was about 
9.3%, which was much lower than the world’s average of 31.4% (Spring, 2018), but still represented 
a huge progress considering that the LCC sector is relatively young in China. 
It should be mentioned that sometimes there is no clear boundary between LCCs and FSAs. The 
airlines listed in Table 1 were considered as LCCs because they fulfill three criteria. First, they are 
recognized as LCCs by the CAAC and treated as LCCs in the media reports. Second, they have 
implemented a strict cost control strategy, including no compensation for flight delay, no free or 
limited meals onboard, lower (less than 20 kg) or no free baggage allowance and lower carry-on 
allowance than what FSAs usually offer. Third, scholarly literature has treated them as LCCs. For 
example, Spring Airlines has been extensively examined by many studies (e.g. Zhang and Lu, 2013; 
Fu et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2017; Dobruszkes and Wang, 2019). Other Chinese LCCs receive less 
attention in scholarly literature but have been mentioned in recent studies such as Liu and Oum 
(2018). Wang et al. (2017) examined the expansion of China’s high-speed rail (HSR) and its impact 
on China’s LCCs including all the LCCs listed in Table 1. Therefore, treating these airlines as LCCs 
is consistent with industry practices and academic literature.    
  
Table 1. Profile of LCCs in China as of December 2017 
Carrier name 
Year declaring 
as LCC 
Fleet size Base Ownership 
Spring Airlines 2005 
81（Airbus 320, 
Boeing 737） 
Shanghai Hongqiao 
and Pudong, 
Shijiazhuang, 
Shenyang, Shenzhen 
Private 
West Air 2013 
30（Airbus 319, 
Airbus 320） 
Chongqing, 
Zhengzhou 
Private 
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China United Airlines 2014 31（Boeing 737） Beijing 
State-
owned 
Jiuyuan Airlines 2014 14（Boeing 737） Guangzhou Private 
Lucky Air 2016 45（Boeing 737） 
Kunming, Lijiang, 
Chengdu 
Private 
Source: Websites of relevant airlines 
Over the last decade, researchers have studied China’s LCC market with a general conclusion that  
LCCs had limited impact on China’s air transport industry (e.g. Fu et. al., 2015; Wu et. al., 2017; 
Jiang et al., 2017). However, existing studies on China’s LCC mainly focus on Spring Airlines as it 
was the only LCC in China before 2013. This paper aims to examine China’s LCC market and assess 
their development pattern, and network structure by considering all Chinese LCCs from a 
geographical perspective. Based on China’s domestic air passenger timetables issued by CAAC, this 
study uses descriptive statistics, mapping and topological structure analysis methods to fulfil the 
study objectives. Also, topological indexes and complex network indicators are used to evaluate the 
network connectivity of each carrier. This study provides a comprehensive analysis on the attributes 
and characteristics of LCCs network, which will contribute to the literature on the development of 
LCCs in emerging markets. 
 
2. Literature review 
It is generally believed that LCCs are good at controlling operation costs by using single model fleet 
and operating short-haul flights with attractive fares and limited cabin services (Bitzan and Peoples, 
2016; Buaphiban and Truong, 2017). In particular, LCCs have traditionally adopted point-to-point 
route strategies (Graham and Shaw, 2008; Graham,2009). During the initial developing period, 
LCCs preferred to open new routes rather than to compete directly with FSAs or charter airlines 
(Dobruszkes, 2013). The entry of LCCs is commonly regarded as a new method to connect airports 
with more destinations and extend airports’ route networks (Wit and Zuidberg, 2016). However, on 
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the other side, the development of LCCs is also restricted by a country’s aviation policy and local 
conditions, such as airport facilities or subsidies policies (Gillen and Lall, 2004; Yu et al., 2019). 
 
Many researchers have assessed the impact of LCCs on the tourism industry. Most researchers found 
that LCC promotions could stimulate new demand, change travel patterns, and develop new tourism 
destinations (e.g. Bel, 2009, Graham, 2013). However, some studies argue that LCCs may not 
necessarily create new demand by bringing in new tourists (Clavé et al., 2015) and that the effect of 
LCCs on tourism remains uncertain, at least from the characteristics and behavior of the tourists 
(Dobruszkes et al., 2016). In some cases, LCCs could have some negative impacts on the tourism 
industry, such as short tourists’ average stay period (Pulina and Cortés-Jiménez, 2010), and decrease 
tourists’ expenditures (Alivernini et al., 2012; Marrocu et al., 2015). In the US and Europe, LCC 
operations have made tourists preferences more flexible and reduced the seasonality of tourist 
arrivals (Donzelli,2010; Graham and Dennis, 2010; Dobruszkes and Mondou, 2013). However, 
Chung and Whang (2011) found that LCC operations have limited impact in reducing tourism 
seasonality in Asia.  
 
Studies on the effect of LCCs on the tourism industry in Asia are small in number. Wu and Hayashi 
(2014) found that LCCs had little impact on the charter traffic due to the differences in target 
markets and routes in Japan. Chung and Whang (2011) claimed that LCCs did not smooth out the 
seasonality of tourist arrivals to Korea’s Jeju Island. China is the largest aviation and tourism market 
in Asia, which has attracted the attention of many researchers in recent years. Some researchers 
investigated the performance of Chinese major airlines in term of their pricing, market power, 
network configuration and so on (e.g. Zhang and Round, 2008; Wang et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2015). A 
number of studies assessed the performance of the largest LCC, Spring Airlines (e.g., Zhang and Lu, 
2013; Fu et al., 2015, Jiang et al., 2017). Dobruszkes and Wang (2019) claim that China’s Spring 
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Airlines is still a small, emerging LCC compared to well-established Ryanair, EasyJet, Southwest, 
and JetBlue. Wang et al. (2018) compared the development of LCCs in China and India and found 
that private and LCCs have become dominant players in the Indian airline market while the state-
owned airlines still enjoy a dominant status in the Chinese market. The heavy presence of LCCs in 
India’s aviation market has resulted in a more elastic travel demand. However, a comprehensive 
study covering all the Chinese LCCs and their network development is still lacking. With the rapid 
expansion of China’s HSR, as a good substitute for air, and particularly for LCC services, it is worth 
taking a close look at China’s LCCs and examine their development trend in the world’s second-
largest aviation market. 
 
3. Data and methodology    
The data used in this paper are obtained from China’s domestic air passenger timetable from 2008 to 
2017. Every year, the CAAC publishes two timetables: the summer & autumn timetable (effective 
from late March to late October) and the winter & spring timetable (effective from late October to 
late March of the next year). The OAG data were used in previous studies when studying Chinese 
LCCs. However, given that many Chinese airlines, especially new airlines and LCCs, do not report 
or only report part of their flight data to OAG, we prefer to use the timetable data. 
 
This study uses descriptive analysis, mapping and network structure analyses to fulfil the study 
purposes. Specifically, the route and network data for each LCC are collected to examine the 
development patterns and make comparisons. In addition, topological indicators are used to evaluate 
the performance of the LCC networks.  
 
Following Jiang et al. (2017), topological indexes are used to assess the network structure of LCCs. 
That is, four topological indexes μ, α, γ and β are used to evaluate the network connectivity of each 
LCC in winter and summer, respectively (Garrison and marble, 1965). μ represents the number of 
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circuits in a network, which reflects the degree of the redundancy and development of the network; α 
is the ratio of the number of circuits in a network relative to the maximal number possible, reflecting 
the complexity of network; γ is the ratio of actual links to the maximal number of air routes, 
representing the cohesiveness of network; and β is the average air routes of each navigable city. The 
formulation of these indexes is as follows:  
 (1) μ=m-n+g  
(2) α=2(m-n+g)/[(n-1) (n-2)]   
(3) γ= 2m/[n(n-1)]    
(4) β = m/n    
where, m is the number of routes; n is the number of navigable cities; and g is the number of 
disconnected subgraphs, which is usually set to 1; and a larger value of α, γ, or β indicates a better 
connectivity.  
 
A number of complex network indicators are also considered. Following Wang et al., (2011), each 
airline network is regarded as an undirected connectivity graph 𝐺𝐺 = (𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸), where V is a set of nodes 
(airports) and E is a set of edges (routes). To compare the different characteristics of network structure 
of the five LCCs, this study adopts the following indicators. 
• Degree distribution 
Degree 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is defined as the number of edges that a node connects, that is, the degree of a node 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖. Assuming that there are N nodes, the average degree of all nodes〈k〉represents the 
degree of the whole network, written as: 
〈 𝑘𝑘〈 = 1
𝑁𝑁
�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
We use probability distribution function 𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘) to describe the degree distribution of a network. 
It reflects the macroscopic statistical characteristics of the network system. 
• Average path length 
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The node distance 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as the number of edges that connects the shortest path between 
node i and j. The average path length (L) represent the mean distance of any two nodes of a 
network, written as: 
𝐿𝐿 = 11
2
𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
It can measure the transmission performance and efficiency of the entire network. 
• Clustering coefficient 
The clustering coefficient (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) of node i is the ratio of the connected edges (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) with all its 
neighbors to the maximum number of possible links. The clustering coefficient of a network (C) 
is the mean value of all the single nodes, written as: 
𝐶𝐶 = 1
𝑛𝑛
�
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 1)/2
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖∈𝑉𝑉
 
This indicator reports to what extent all nodes in the network is clustering, and the larger the 
value is, the easier for the nodes to connect each other by short distance. 
 
4. Routes expansion and network construction of Chinese LCCs 
The first batch of LCCs were established around 2005-2006, but only Spring Airlines survived and 
succeeded. It is argued that 2014 is the banner year for the Chinese LCC industry because of the 
release of the Guiding Opinions on Promoting Low Cost Aviation Industry Development in 2014 by 
the CAAC. For the first time, the aviation authorities acknowledged the significant role played by 
LCCs in the nation’s economy. This led to some existing FSAs transforming and rebranding 
themselves as LCCs including China United Airlines.   
 
4.1 The development of individual LCCs 
4.1.1 Spring Airlines and Jiuyuan Airlines1  
 
1 As Jiuyuan is still small in scale, we only briefly describe its network in words without presenting its network map.   
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From 2008 to 2013, the number of passengers carried by Spring Airlines increased from 2.9 million 
to 9.1 million, the number of cities served increased from 20 cities to 41, and the number of routes 
increased from 23 to 64. By the end of 2017, Spring served 62 domestic cities and carried 1.3 million 
passengers in the domestic market. Figure 1 illustrates Spring’s fast domestic route expansion from 
2008 to 2017. A closer examination of its network data reveals the following key developments over 
this period. First, it entered key trunk and profitable routes such as Shanghai-Beijing and Shanghai-
Guangzhou. This is not easy as market access to the routes associated with Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou are still regulated to protect the interests of the state-owned carriers. Although based in 
Shanghai, Spring did not obtain the right to fly the Shanghai-Beijing route until 2011 and it was only 
allowed to fly one flight with the departure time close to mid-night. Second, it constructed three new 
hubs, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang and Shenzhen. This is due in part to the heavy subsidies provided by 
the local governments and the geographic importance of these cities. For example, the choice of 
Shijiazhuang is largely because of its closeness to Beijing. As it was difficult to gain access to the 
Beijing market, operating a base near Beijing could be a second best solution. In addition, the CAAC 
announced in 2017 that some flights from second- and third-tier cities to over-congested Beijing 
Airport would be shifted to Tianjin and Shijiazhuang and it is only half an hour’s ride from these 
cities to Beijing via HSR (Zhang et al., 2017). Third, Spring launched and increased flights to long-
haul route destinations in Southeast and Northwest China such as Kunming, Chengdu, Chongqing, 
Urumqi, most of which have an intermediate point at small airports. Spring has constantly changed 
the intermediate airports. For example, in recent year, it shifted some of its intermediate points from 
Central China to less developed Southwest China, including Guiyang, and Zunyi.  
The distribution of China’s aviation market is mainly driven by routes associated with a few major 
cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (O’Connor et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2019). The vast 
majority of China’s flights are operated in the area to the east of Beijing-Guangzhou route, more than 
60% of which are within the triangle area formed by Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou (Zhu et al., 
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2018). Increasing competition from HSR in this triangle has forced China’s airlines to keep an eye 
on a broader market including underdeveloped West China and international markets. Therefore, 
apart from looking to the less developed region, Spring has put a substantial part of its capacity in the 
international markets in the last few years. At the same time, it suspended routes overlapped with 
HSR and Juneyao Airlines, another Shanghai based private carrier (Wu et al., 2017). 
 
2008 
11 
 
 
2013 
12 
 
 
2017 
Figure 1. Route expansion of Spring Airlines 2008-2017 
Juneyao Airlines started operations from September 2006 and bears several striking similarities to 
Spring Airlines: both are privately owned and headquartered in Shanghai; both account for a market 
share of about 9% at Pudong and Hongqiao airports in terms of the number of flights. In addition, 
both have a similar fleet-size and scale. Nevertheless, Juneyao is positioned as an FSA, targeting 
medium to high income-level passengers and focusing on bigger cities. Thus, by the end of 2013, 
80% of the cities served by Juneyao were provincial, autonomous regional, and municipal capitals or 
important commercial cities, and the rest 20% were regional centers such as Xilinhot, Baotou, 
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Qinhuangdao, Changzhi, and Tongliao. Seeing the great potential of the LCC market, Juneyao 
Airlines invested a new LCC - Jiuyuan Airlines in 2014. Probably influenced by its parent company, 
Jiuyuan takes Guangzhou as its only hub and operates flights mainly on trunk routes connecting 
provincial capital cities. 
 
4.1.2 China United Airlines 
China United Airlines was re-launched by China Eastern Airlines and China Aviation Supplies 
Import and Export Group as an FSA in 2012, and quickly switched to the LCC model in 2014. It is 
the only state-owned LCC in China. It is also the only commercial airline approved by Air Force to 
use Beijing Nanyuan Airport (a military air base with civil aviation facilities) as its home airport. 
Figure 3 shows that compared with its network in 2008, China United launched more short-haul 
flights to regional cities located in Inner Mongolia and Shanxi Province in 2013, most of which are 
military airports. From 2014 to 2017, it extended its destinations to major cities in Northwest and 
Southeast China, or along the midstream and downstream of Yangtze River with little overlapping 
with its parent company, China Eastern’s network. During this period, China United also suspended 
routes overlapped with HSR. It is apparent that the distribution of its parent company’s network and 
its historical link with Air Force are two important factors leading to this expansion pattern. As 
market access to and from Beijing is still regulated and China United has enjoyed such protection, 
there is no sign for it to develop other hubs before it loses such protection.   
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Figure 2. Route expansion of China United Airlines 2008-2017 
 
4.1.3 West Air and Lucky Air 
West Air and Lucky Air are both subsidiaries of HNA Group. Taking Chongqing Jiangbei Airport as 
its major home hub, West Airlines was transformed into an LCC in 2012. Since then, West Air has 
attempted to build Chongqing as a tourism transfer hub to Yunnan and Sichuan by providing 
competitive fares. Figure 3 shows the routes of West Air in 2008, 2013 and 2017. Before 2013, West 
Air mainly developed routes to East and South China. Since becoming an LCC, it started to develop 
new routes to Southwest China, including tourist destinations located in Yunnan, Sichuan and 
Guizhou that are rich in tourism resources. It also launched services on long-haul routes to 
Northwest China such as Urumqi that is rich in mineral and energy resources. Since 2013, West Air 
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has built a new hub at Zhengzhou Airport that is currently developing a reputation of aviation city in 
Central China supported by the Central Government. 
 
 
 
2008                                          
18 
 
 
2013 
 
 
2017 
Figure 3. Route expansion of West Air 2008-2017 
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Lucky Air had investment from HNA (68%), Shanxi Airlines (31%), and a travel company in 2004, 
and started operations in Yunnan Province. It initially operated services from Kunming to Dali and 
Xishuangbanna, and then expanded its network to North and Central China. After the state-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Yunnan Province became one of the main 
stakeholders, Lucky Air shifted part of its capacity back to Yunnan and increased services to the 
provincial regional airports such as Simao, Dehong, and Tengchong. Thus, Lucky Air has gradually 
developed Kunming into a transfer hub, transporting tourists from other provinces to Kunming and 
then from Kunming to the provincial tourist destinations. Figure 4 shows that Lucky Air’s network 
development from 2008 to 2017 is quite impressive. It has connected Kunming with many other 
provincial capitals, including Xi'an, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Lanzhou, Taiyuan, Wuhan, Chengdu, 
Changsha, Guiyang, and Zhengzhou. Many of the long-haul routes have intermediate points to allow 
the carrier to achieve a higher load factor.   
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Figure 4. Route expansion of Lucky Air 2008-2017 
4.2 LCC network structure indicator comparison     
Table 2 shows the results of the complex network indicators of each LCC. The characteristics of 
China’s air transport network reported in Wang et al. (2011) are also included as a comparison. 
Compared with China’s overall air transport network, Chinese LCCs are small in scale as can be 
seen from the numbers of nodes and edges. This is also evidenced by the relatively small average 
degrees. In contrast, Dobruszkes and Wang (2019) report that major LCCs in the US and Europe 
have an average degree around 12-15. Interestingly, the average path lengths do not differ much 
across LCCs and the values are larger than those reported in Xu and Harriss (2008) for the US 
aviation market. Except Jiuyuan, the magnitudes of Chinese LCCs’ clustering coefficients are similar 
to those of Ryanair and Easyjet reported in Dobruszkes and Wang (2019). In addition, all the degree 
distributions in Figure 5 clearly follow a power law. These indicators may suggest that the Chinese 
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LCCs’ networks have the properties of small-world and scale-free. They are still in a rapid 
development stage and far from mature.  
Table 2 Characteristics of the networks of Chinese LCCs 
Airline 
name 
No. 
nodes(n) 
No. 
edges(m) 
Average 
degree(〈k〉) 
Average path length 
(L) 
Clustering coefficient 
(C) 
Spring Airlines 72 146 4.06 2.33 0.49 
West Air 47 90 3.83 2.22 0.40 
China United  66 91 2.76 2.28 0.56 
Jiuyuan Airlines 22 34 3.09 2.51 0.23 
Lucky Air 79 145 3.67 2.46 0.45 
China’s airline 
network (Wang 
et al., 2011) 
144 1018 14.14 2.23 0.69 
 
  
Spring Airlines West Air 
  
China United  Jiuyuan Airlines 
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Lucky Air 
 
Figure 5. Degree distributions of Chinese LCC’s network 
 
 
4.3 Market structure of LCC routes 
In 2017, LCCs operated scheduled flights on more than 400 domestic routes, accounting for a share 
of 13% in the domestic market. Table 3 reports the market structure of the routes where LCC was 
present based on the the summer season schedule data in 2017. The LCC routes are grouped into five 
categories based on the LCC market share measured by the number of flights. The proportion of the 
routes of each category is shown in the table. The monopoly group contains the routes only served 
by an LCC. For the group with the LLC share less than 25%, the LCC can be seen as a fringe carrier.     
As can be seen, Spring and Lucky were the only service provider on 42% of the routes that they each 
served. It is worth noting that 68% of the China United’s routes were monopoly routes. This clearly 
shows that Spring, Lucky and China United deliberately devoted a significant amount of their 
capacity on the routes that are not served by other airlines. This pattern is similar to that of the major 
US and European LCCs reported in Dobruszkes and Wang (2019). In contrast, Jiuyuan and West 
Air’s monopoly routes only accounted for 12% and 15% of their total routes, respectively. These two 
LCCs each commanded a share of less than 25% on a large proportion of their routes. Such 
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significantly different penetration patterns imply that Chinese LCCs are actively pursuing a niche 
market in their own market area. Interestingly, the percentage is almost zero for the 75%-100% 
category, implying that LCCs are unlikely to dominate a market where there is a presence of an FSA. 
This may suggest that Chinese LCCs are operating in an unfavorable environment and that market 
access restrictions are imposed on the LCC sector (Zhang and Zhang, 2017). With the opening of the 
new Beijing Daxing Airport and the introduction of the third terminal in Shanghai, congestion may 
be of a less concern in these cities, and it is possible that state-owned and LCCs could be treated 
equally.  
The average route distance of each LCC is quite similar and almost all of them have engaged long-
haul routes of more than 3000km. it should be noted that LCCs seldom compete directly with each 
other on the same route, as the number of routes served by two or more LCCs was only about 10% of 
the total LCC routes.  
Table 3 Market structure of LCC routes in 2017 
 
Airline 
Percentage of routes based on LCC market share  Distance (km) 
Monopoly 
(100%)  75%-100%  50%-75%  25%-50%  Less than 25%  
Average Longest 
Spring  42% 0% 6% 19% 33%  1421  3277 
Lucky 42% 0% 10% 18% 30%  1178  3087 
Jiuyuan 12% 0% 10% 14% 64%  1499  3278 
China 
United 
68% 1% 11% 7% 13%  1086  2431 
West Air 15% 0% 18% 26% 41%  1250  3024 
 
4.4 LCC route distance comparison  
Table 4 reports the percentages of the routes in different distance categories. As can be seen, the 
distances of most of the routes served by LCCs are between 600-1800km, particularly concentrating 
on the range of 1200-1800km, which in contrast with the median distance flown by the LCCs in 
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Europe which was around 900km (Dobruszkes, 2013). It is likely that for the markets less than 
600km, HSR and other transport modes are good substitutes in China and air travel is less preferred 
(Zhu et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2019). Interestingly, Chinese LCCs have a higher percentage of long-
haul routes (greater than 1800km) than their FSA counterparts. Compared with other LCCs, China 
United seems to be more interested in shorter routes (less than 1200km). This distribution pattern is 
quite similar to those of China Southern and China Eastern.    
Table 4. Proportions of LCC routes in different distance categories in 2017 
 Less than 
600km 
600-
1200km 
1200-
1800km 
1800-
2400km 
Over 
2400km 
Spring  18.2% 29.8% 38.0% 12.4% 1.7% 
Lucky Air 2.7% 34.8% 40.2% 18.8% 3.6% 
Jiuyuan 6.9% 31.0% 48.3% 10.3% 3.4% 
China United 16.9% 42.8% 24.7% 13.0% 2.6% 
West Air 2.9% 30.9% 47.1% 10.3% 8.8% 
Air China 9.7% 42.9% 36.9% 7.0% 2.4% 
China Eastern 12.1% 48.9% 30.8% 5.9% 2.2% 
China 
Southern 
12.0% 48.4% 27.2% 8.4% 3.8% 
 
4.5 Seasonality and connectivity of the LCC network  
In 2017, Chinese LCCs operated flights on 403 domestic routes in summer and 396 routes in winter. 
Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of these routes. It can be observed that LCCs mainly served the 
routes connecting cities located in South and East China with dense population and high level of 
economic development. The network extended to the south in winter but moved to north in summer. 
This pattern is similar to the direction of Chinese domestic tourism flows: southbound in winter, but 
northbound in summer. In particular, the number of routes connecting the famous tourist cities in 
Southern China such as Haikou, Sanya and Xiamen was lower in summer but higher in winter. For 
LCC operation hubs such as Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Shanghai, Kunming and Chongqing, the LCC 
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traffic flows were less affected by the seasonality and the number of LCC routes remained relatively 
stable throughout the year.  
 
Figure 6. LCC routes and destinations in 2017: summer vs winter 
Table 5 shows the calculation results of the network connectivity. It can been seen that the LCC 
network structure exhibits obvious seasonality, as the values of α and γ decrease from summer to 
winter. In other words, the network concentration degree of each LCC in summer is higher than in 
winter. From the level of the index μ, we can see that Lucky Air and Spring Airlines have developed 
a more advanced network. According to the values of β and γ, Spring Airlines’ network structure is 
better than other airlines. The connectivity of Lucky Air in winter is better than in summer. It 
appears that West Air needs to improve it network connectivity in both summer and winter.  
 
Table 5 The network structure index  
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  n m μ α γ β 
Lucky summer 59 107 49 0.030 0.063 1.814 
winter 64 121 58 0.030 0.060 1.891 
Spring summer 56 122 67 0.020 0.079 2.179 
winter 55 112 58 0.019 0.075 2.036 
Jiuyuan summer 17 25 9 0.075 0.184 1.471 
winter 19 29 11 0.072 0.170 1.526 
China 
United 
summer 50 76 18 0.011 0.044 1.288 
winter 61 77 17 0.010 0.042 1.262 
West Air summer 46 75 30 0.030 0.072 1.609 
winter 41 68 28 0.036 0.083 1.659 
 
4.6. The presence of Chinese LCCs in the international markets 
The focus of this paper is mainly on the domestic market for the following reasons. First, China’s 
aviation and competition policies still favor the state-owned FSAs and discriminate against the LCCs 
and private carriers (Yu et al., 2019). It is difficult for the LCCs to gain access to the domestic 
lucrative routes associated with Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, let alone the international routes. 
Due to the market access restrictions, Chinese LCCs’ international businesses are relatively small. 
Second, as Chinese LCCs mainly operate the routes for tourism purposes, their international services 
are subject to frequent changes, suspensions and cancellations. This is because international tourist 
flows are heavily affected by seasonality, bilateral relations, natural disasters, etc. For example, 
Spring served 17 international routes in 2014, and opened 64 new routes in 2015. However, the total 
number of its international routes was only 52 at the end of 2015. Therefore, it is difficult to paint a 
consistent picture of the LCC’s international network. Table 6 compiles the international services 
provided by Chinese LCCs.  
Table 6. International routes and destinations served by Chinese LCCs 
Code No. of 
routes 
Description 
Spring 
Airlines 
52  
-  Started international services in 2010. 
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-  From 2013 to 2017, international routes increased from 7 to 
52; The proportion of international ASK in total ASK 
increased from 8.78% to 30.4%. 
-  Overseas destinations at the end of 2017: Cambodia (Phnom 
Penh, Siem Reap), Japan (Ibaraki, Nagoya, Osaka, Saga, 
Sapporo, Takamatsu, Tokyo), Malaysia (Sabah), Singapore, 
South Korea (Seoul, Jeju) and Thailand (Bangkok, Chiang 
Mai, Krabi, Phuket, Surat Thani). 
Lucky 
Air 
17  -  Started international services in 2014. 
-  The proportion of international ASK in total ASK reached  
12.9% in 2017. 
-  Overseas destinations at the end of 2017: Brunei (Bandar Seri 
Begawan), Indonesia (Bali, Jakarta), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 
Penang, Sabah), Philippines (Manila, Cebu), Russia (Moscow, 
Irkutsk), Singapore, Korea (Jeju), Thailand (Bangkok, Krabi, 
Koh Samui) and Vietnam (Nha Trang). 
West 
Air 
4  -  Started international services in 2016. 
-  Overseas destinations at the end of 2017: Singapore, South 
Korea (Jeju), Philippines (Kalibo, Cebu) 
China 
United 
1  -  Started international services in 2017 
-  One route at the end of 2017: Beijing-Yantai- Fukuoka 
Jiuyuan 
Airlines 
0 -  No international services before 2018.  
 
Source: Annual financial report of Spring Airlines (2014-2019) and relevant airlines’ media releases. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, Chinese LCCs launched services to many tourism destinations. This is 
not surprising as Spring’s parent company is Shanghai Spring International Travel Service (Group) 
Co., Ltd., and the purpose of establishing Spring was to sell packaged tourism products including air 
tickets. Most of the Spring’s flights were chartered by Shanghai Spring International Travel Service 
before 2014, and also by other travel agents after 2015. Lucky has advertised its commitment of 
bringing passengers to ‘exotic foreign capitals and islands’. Lucky’s flights were chartered by travel 
agents before 2016. In 2016, the company opened the Kunming-Bangkok route, and began to handle 
the ticket sales by itself. Other LCCs had little presence in the international markets.  
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The low presence of Chinese LCCs on the international routes compared with Ryanair and Easyjet 
(over shorter distances in Europe) is largely due to China’s protectionism policy towards the state-
owned FSAs (Zhang and Zhang, 2017). In 2009, the CAAC introduced the ‘one route one Chinese 
carrier policy’ on the long-haul international routes (greater than 4500km) to the US and Europe to 
avoid cut-throat completion among Chinese carriers.2 In 2018, the policy was revised, aiming 
to establish a sound, open, fair and just management system for international traffic rights resource 
allocation and use. It is hoped that this will open new opportunities for Chinese LCCs to access the 
long-haul international markets in the coming decade.   
4.7 A summary  
The above analysis shows that Chinese LCCs have experienced steady growth and successfully 
expanded their domestic networks. Spring Airlines has the most extensive network with hubs in 
Shanghai, Shijiazhuang, Shenyang, and Shenzhen. The development of Jiuyuan Airlines is at the 
preliminary stage, and its routes are relatively sparse. The routes of China United Airline mainly 
spread out from Beijing. In North and Northwest China, China United Airlines dominates the LCC 
market. It seems that West Air and Lucky Air are the only two LCCs that are deliberately developing 
a hub-and-spoke system, using their home base as a transfer hub. West Airlines takes Chongqing as 
its main transfer hub, linking cities in Central and West China. It has now expanded its network to 
the cities in Xinjiang and Tibet that have few direct flight links with Central and East China. Finally, 
Lucky Airlines mainly dominates the LCC markets in Southwest China, and contributes the 
connectivity of the tourist cities in Yunnan Province to the rest of the country via the capital city, 
Kunming. Apparently the historical background of each LCC has influenced the selection of their 
home base and that in developing new bases, local government subsidies, the geographic location 
and the presence of other airlines are significant considerations. 
 
2 These regulations have limited the growth and expansion of Chinese LCCs in the international markets. Even in the Northeast Asia 
market where there is a large Chinese tourist traffic, the number of passengers carried by Korean LCCs is five times higher than by 
Chinese LCCs (Ma et al., 2020).     
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It appears that these LCCs seldom share overlapping routes and hubs. They tend to target different 
markets as can be seen in the differences in airports they serve in Figure 7. The differences in 
distributions of the airports show the effect of the LCCs’ strategy to consider the competition from 
peers, but also the network and impact of FSAs. As Chinese government has encouraged and guided 
mergers between state-owned carriers (Zhang, 2015), defending the market share is a challenge for 
private carriers. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that each LCC has sought their own niche 
market with different focuses. The way that LCCs manage these network structures will be a 
significant factor in determining whether LCCs could survive and succeed in China’s air transport 
market.  
 
Figure 7. Number of airports served by each LCC in different regions in 2017 
 
There were 203 new routes launched and 73 suspended in the period 2014-2017. Except Spring, all 
the LCCs have a parent airline. Therefore, these LCCs tend to choose a different home base and 
develop their networks with little overlapping with their parents. Figure 8 shows that air services to 
the tourism cities in Northwest and Southwest China have been strengthened as a result of the entry 
of LCCs, especially in Tibet, Xinjiang, Gansu and Yunnan Province. This phenomenon suggests that 
LCCs have looked to the underdeveloped area in West China, which has long been ignored by FSAs.  
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Figure 8．Changes of domestic LCC routes: 2013 vs 2017 
 
5. Driving forces shaping behind the LCC network development in China 
Aviation deregulation, local government subsidization, and the growth of leisure demand are 
believed to be the key factors driving the LCC network expansion. Aviation policy plays a 
significant role in influencing the development pattern of Chinese LCCs. Although regarded as a 
successful airline, Spring Airlines also faced the restrictions on the entry into some lucrative routes 
and ideal time slots (Zhang and Zhang, 2017). It had to wait for six years before allowed to fly the 
Shanghai-Beijing route in 2011 (Zhang and Lu, 2013). A few months later, Spring had to give up 
this important route as the low fare would not help attract many passengers due to the undesirable 
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departure and arrival times.3 In 2015, The CAAC announced that it would reform flight time slot 
allocation at Guangzhou Baiyun Airport and Shanghai Pudong Airport with an aim to promote 
transparency, efficiency and equity as the previous allocation system favoured the state-owned 
airlines, which led to rampant corruption and bribery (Zhang and Zhang, 2017). The new allocation 
methods seemed to be fairer to the LCCs and private airlines. However, in the first round of slot 
auction at Baiyun Airport, all the good slots were claimed by the state-owned airlines and their 
subsidiaries, simply because they were too costly to the private carriers. An unfavourable operating 
environment would limit the growth of LCCs and force them to focus on the markets that are of less 
interest to state-owned carriers.   
Subsidies from local governments constitute a significant part of LCCs’ revenue and profits. Before 
Spring became a publicly listed company in 2015, its financial report revealed that government 
subsidies accounted for 55%, 53%, 60% and 75% of its profits in 2011, 2012, 2013 and the first half 
of 2014, respectively. The choice of Shijiazhuang as its second hub was not by chance. The generous 
subsidies from Shijiazhuang Government and Shijiazhuang Airport have incentivized Spring to 
deploy much of its capacity to Shijiazhuang and its market share has quickly exceeded other airlines 
including those that have had a base in Shijiazhuang. The contribution of Spring to the local 
economy was obvious: in 2010, Shijiazhuang Airport only handled about 2.7 million passengers and 
this number was 10 million in 2018. Spring alone contributed one third of the total passenger 
throughput. This is also the case for other LCCs that tend to develop their networks towards cities 
that provide generous subsidies.      
 
Most LCCs have cancelled services in the markets with parallel HSR, suggesting that HSR is a close 
substitute of the LCC products, and has an impact on LCCs’ route development. In the last decade, 
HSR has emerged as a significant transport mode in China. In 2017 the length of China’s HSR track 
 
3 Spring Airlines re-entered the Shanghai-Beijing market a few years later. 
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amounted to 20,000 km, representing the largest HSR network in the world. According to the 
updated ‘Medium-to-Long-Term Railway Network Plan’ report covering the period 2016–25 with an 
outlook to 2030, China’s HSR network will by 2025 reach a total of 38,000 km, including eight 
north–south and eight east–west trunk lines (Fu et al., 2015; Ma et al., 2020). By 2030 China’s HSR 
network will reach 45,000 km in length, and most cities with a population of 500,000 or more will be 
connected by HSR. Chen (2017) finds that there was a significant drop in air traffic, flight frequency 
and seat capacity after the introduction of parallel HSR services and that the sizes of the effects 
differed across different HSR routes. Yang et al. (2018) find that the entry of a new HSR service led 
to a 27% reduction in air traffic. Zhang and Zhang (2016) confirm the negative effect of HSR on air 
passenger flows in China. The challenge from HSR will be greater after the rapidly expanding HSR 
network has connected most of the major cities, particularly after flexible HSR fares are offered. 
This will force Chinese airlines to consider redeploying part of their capacity to other markets, 
including international ones. This puts Chinese LCCs in a more difficult situation than their FSA 
counterparts. The emergence of HSR has given China’s state-owned carriers and the aviation 
authorities the excuse to further restrict new entry to the profitable routes. Therefore, ‘going west’ 
and serving smaller cities are a natural choice for most of the new LCCs. In Southwest China, West 
Air and Lucky Air have enjoyed a relatively less competitive environment and expanded their routes 
largely because this region has not be well integrated into the nation’s HSR system at the time of this 
research. 
   
6. Conclusion  
This study explores the development patterns of Chinese LCCs by analyzing their destinations, and 
network structures from a geographical perspective. As Chinese LCCs are still far from mature, 
research into their network development patterns is of great significance for the growth of the LCC 
market and China’s tourism sector. The results show that a nationwide LCC network has been 
34 
 
constructed with each individual LCC focusing on their own markets to avoid overlapping and cut-
throat competition. Spring Airlines has developed an advanced network supported by its core bases 
including Shanghai in East China, Shijiazhuang in North China, Shenyang in Northeast China and 
Shenzhen in South China. China United has developed a network radiating from Beijing. West Air 
and Lucky Air seem to be developing a hub-and-spoke network that contributes to the tourism 
industry in West China. The LCC networks are affected by seasonal variations, especially for the 
routes to tourism destinations such as Haikou, Sanya and Xiamen. Hub cities, however, receive less 
seasonal impacts. This research also finds that routes between 600-1800 km account for a large 
proportion of the LCC markets. During the period of 2014-2017, long-haul routes have significantly 
increased owing to the development of tourism market in West China. Aviation policy, local 
government’s subsidization and the expansion of the HSR network are the driving forces behind the 
development of China’s LCC network.    
      
China’s tourism destinations are no longer confined in the east and south. There has been increasing 
tourism demand for the northwest, southwest and northeast regions. LCCs can improve the 
accessibility to these tourism destinations. However, it should be noted that the network analysis of 
this study is based on standard geographic methods. Future studies should consider incorporating 
demand-side factors into the LCC network analysis to give a more comprehensive assessment of the 
development of LCCs in China and their impact on China’s tourism. 
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